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Using qualitative and quantitative data obtained from 30 interviews with local law 
enforcement managers (12 county sheriffs and 18 municipal police chiefs), this study 
explores the decision-making processes used by these managers in the context of a pursuit-
related accident involving an innocent third party.  My findings suggest that: (1) managers 
most often conduct internal investigations to ensure that their officers’ behavior 
demonstrated adherence to the agency’s standard operating procedures; (2) managers use 
multiple mechanisms, including consultations with legal actors and professional peers, to 
keep their pursuit policies updated with regard to case law; (3) policy restrictiveness shares 
a positive, but marginal, relationship with a manager’s education level; (4) policy 
restrictiveness shares a negative, but marginal, relationship with a manager’s total number 
of professional association memberships; and (5) policy restrictiveness shares a significant 
negative relationship with a manager’s total years of law enforcement experience.    
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Pursuit driving is one of the most captivating law enforcement behaviors in American 
popular culture.  It is also one of the most easily recognizable situations in which public 
sector accountability and the phenomenon of multi-jurisdictional governance can be found.  
Consider, for instance, the Fox network’s perennial run of World’s Wildest Police Videos.  
Now in syndication, this show was essentially a compilation of agency-submitted videos 
showcasing police officers engaged in pursuits and other dangerous situations.  Pursuits 
have also been fodder for news media reports, such as the recent piece written by journalist 
Lara Moore detailing her experience when a simple “ride-along” with Sgt. Cullen LaFrance 
of the Cumming, Georgia, Police Department turned into a “harrowing” police chase 
(Moore 2008), or the televised coverage of the 1993 O. J. Simpson pursuit spectacle.  This 
can easily be seen as an issue to which scholars of social justice might attend, especially if 
one remembers that the infamous Rodney King beating was preceded by a pursuit.  
Surprisingly, scholarly attention to police pursuits has only developed recently.  It is within 
this realm that pursuits have been most thoroughly scrutinized, and sometimes completely 
demonized.  
 One might begin to question why police pursuits are so intriguing.  Perhaps the 
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answer rests with the fact that the pursuit itself is an awesome display of law enforcement 
officers’ power, manifested in their willingness to risk endangering themselves in order to 
apprehend criminals. With this great power, however, comes a matching level of 
responsibility because law enforcement officers involved in pursuits hold the potential to 
endanger not only themselves, but also the suspects being chased and the innocent by-
standers and drivers who happen to chance upon the pursuit.  In fact, some scholars argue 
that pursuit driving is a display of deadly force (Alpert and Friddell 1992; Alpert 1998) and 
should be regulated with the same degree of caution that agencies give to shooting 
decisions. 
 Increasingly, litigation has become a common mechanism for ensuring that a law 
enforcement agency is held accountable for pursuit decisions (Becknell, Mays, and Giever 
1999; Kennedy, Homant, and Kennedy 1992; Hicks 2006).  Despite this surge in litigation, 
Hicks’ (2006, 106) examination of the pursuit policies of 47 state police agencies in the 
United States suggests that law enforcement agencies might not give adequate consideration 
to the legal implications of pursuit driving, because many policies failed to mention 
“elements pertaining to liability and negligence: concerns that have been demonstrated to be 
instigators of liability.”  This is troubling, Hicks (2007, v) asserts because “legal rulings 
resulting from instances of pursuit can impact other areas of law enforcement and serve to 
heighten the legal risks for most contemporary law enforcement organizations.”  
 Awareness of the potential effects of such legal decisions upon one’s agency is the 
essence of what Romzek and Dubnick (1987) label “legal accountability”: defined as the 
process by which actors outside of an agency wield the ability to impose legal sanctions on 
the agency. However, employees of a law enforcement agency are also expected to 
demonstrate a degree of accountability to the organization’s guiding principles, embodied in 
the agency’s standard operating procedures manual.  This form of accountability is what 
Romzek and Dubnick (1987) label bureaucratic accountability.  
 In the event of a pursuit-related tragedy, these two forms of accountability seem to 
conflict with one another.  In these instances, local law enforcement managers must make 
difficult decisions about legal accountability vis-a-vis bureaucratic accountability, the most 
important of which center on: (1) the restrictiveness of the agency’s pursuit policy, 
operationalized as the nature and types of offenses for which pursuits are condoned; and (2) 
the sources of information by which law enforcement managers keep their pursuit policies 
updated with regard to recent court decisions (Kennedy et. al. 1992). 
Using qualitative data obtained from 30 interviews with local law enforcement 
managers (12 county sheriffs and 18 municipal police chiefs), this study explores the 
decision-making processes used by these managers in the context of a pursuit-related 
accident involving an innocent third party.  The key research questions guiding this 
exploration are: (1) What immediate action does each manager take in the wake of a 
pursuit-related accident?; (2) What mechanisms do these managers employ to ensure that 
their pursuit policies are adequate and up-to-date with regard to case law changes?; and (3) 
What relationships exist between geographic, demographic, and personal characteristics of a 
given manager and his agency and the agency’s policy restrictiveness?  After briefly 
describing this chapter’s methodology and participants, I will begin to tackle these 
questions. 
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Method 
As part of a larger project, this study uses qualitative data obtained through in-depth 
interviews with 12 county sheriffs in Iowa (4), Illinois (5), and Wisconsin (3), and 18 
municipal police chiefs in eight of these counties, this study explores the choice patterns of 
county sheriffs and municipal police chiefs elicited from their responses to a scenario that 
places legal accountability at odds with bureaucratic accountability to the agency’s standard 
operating procedures (SOPs).  Additionally, I will compare the mechanisms that sheriffs 
and chiefs use in order to keep their policies updated.  Later in the paper, I will employ 
statistical techniques to explore relationships between an agency’s policy restrictiveness and 
a host of variables related to an agency and its manager.  Thus, this paper will leverage a 
mixed methods approach to answer the research questions. 
 
Case Selection and Process 
Cases were selected based on two criteria.  First, in order to hold constant any regional 
effects on law enforcement decision-making, I used a purposive sampling method that 
targeted sheriffs and police chiefs in three Midwestern states.  Second, in order to capture 
variation in decision-making based on agency size, I chose only counties with an 
urbanization index (UI) score of 2 or 5 (see Table 2) 
In the recruitment phase (April 2008-October 2008), I mailed cover letters, made 
phone calls, and sent e-mails to 16 sheriffs and 43 police chiefs.  In the end, I successfully 
recruited 12 sheriffs (75% participation rate) and 18 police chiefs (42% participation rate).  
Eight sheriffs came from UI-2 counties, and four sheriffs came from UI-5 counties.  
Fourteen police chiefs came from UI-2 counties, and four came from UI-5 counties.  Once 
recruited, interviews were conducted in the managers’ offices or via telephone.  
 
Respondent Characteristics  
Out of space considerations, the most pertinent data reflecting respondent characteristics 
appear in Table 1. For greater detail regarding the characteristics of individuals in the 
sample, see LaFrance and Placide, 2010. Most generally, all law enforcement managers 
were males.  All sheriffs were Caucasian and only two chiefs were non-Caucasian (both 
were African American).  
  
The Scenario 
Each manager was presented with the following scenario: 
Your officer is involved in the pursuit of a fleeing felon. During the course of this pursuit, 
the felon loses control of his vehicle and crashes into an uninvolved bystander vehicle. The 
driver of this uninvolved vehicle now wants to sue your department. What do you do? 
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Table 1: Average Respondent Characteristics of Sheriffs and Chiefs 
 
Type of 
Mgr 
M
ea
n
 A
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e
 
E
d
u
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n
 
D
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tr
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u
ti
o
n
 Median 
Years 
in 
Current 
Position 
Mean Total 
Training  
(State + 
Local + 
National + 
Workshops) 
Mean Total 
Professional 
Association 
Memberships 
(National + 
State + Local) 
Sheriff 54 
Ran
ge 
45-
61 
HS 
diploma: 
1 
AA 
Degree: 
2 
BA 
Degree: 
7 
MA 
Degree: 
2 
7 
Range
: 
1-16 
2.5 2.5 
Police 
Chief 
51 
Ran
ge: 
38-
64 
HS 
Diploma
: 1 
Some 
College
: 1 
AA 
Degree: 
1 
BA 
Degree: 
7 
MA 
Degree: 
7 
PhD 
Degree: 
1 
JD 
Degree:  
1 
4.5 
Range: 
2 
months- 
27 
Years 
2.28 2.39 
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Table 2: Urbanization Index Scores of Respondents 
County          Score 
F 5 
L 2 
C 5 
I 2 
D 2 
K 5 
G 2 
B 2 
H 2 
J 2 
E 5 
A 2 
Source: 2003 USDA Urban Influence Codes 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/UrbanInfluenceCodes/2003/ 
  
Results 
Managers’ Scenario Responses (see Table 3) 
When presented with the scenario, most managers (20/30, or 66%) explained that they 
would conduct an internal investigation to ensure that the pursuing officers followed each 
department’s pursuit policy.  Two of these 20 managers also claimed that they would review 
the agency’s pursuit policy.  An additional two managers simply suggested that they would 
review the policy, but did not mention an internal review.  Three other managers suggested 
that they would take no action.  Instead, these three suggested, they would rely on the 
soundness of their pursuit policy and would let their departments’ insurance companies 
handle the lawsuit.  Two other chiefs (from the same county) explained that an outside, state 
level, agency would review the pursuit.  Finally, two other chiefs (from another county) 
suggested that they would publicly blame the suspect for the injuries sustained by the 
uninvolved third party.  However, these final two chiefs conceded that it was doubtful that 
the city attorneys or the departments’ legal counsel would allow them to speak openly about 
the incident. 
Table 3: Scenario Responses 
 
Type of 
manager 
Internal 
investigation 
Review 
policy 
No action 
(rely on 
policy and 
insurance) 
Outside 
review 
(DCI, 
state 
patrol, 
etc.) 
Publicly 
blame 
suspect 
Chiefs 12 4 2 2 2 
Sheriffs 10 1 1 0 0 
 
Note: Some chiefs gave more than one response. 
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Mechanisms Used to Keep Policies Updated (see Table 4) 
With all due respect to these two exceptional rationales, one can safely conclude that the 
creation and revision of detailed pursuit policies are commonly undertaken in order to 
ameliorate potential legal liability among managers in this sample.  With this in mind, each 
manager was asked to describe the methods he uses to ensure that his pursuit policies (and 
all other policies) are effective in minimizing legal liability.  Managers’ responses to this 
question fall within eight broad categories (see Table 4).  Because most managers cited 
multiple mechanisms used to ensure the policies were adequate and timely (with regard to 
current case law), I have ranked each mechanism by the order each manager mentioned it. 
  
Independently reviewing case law.  As Table 4 shows, 19 managers suggested that 
they look at case law changes on their own, whether by subscribing to a database of case law 
such as WestLaw or regularly meeting with members of their command staff.  Twelve of 
these managers cited this as the number one mechanism of keeping their policies up to date 
and six cited this as the second most commonly used mechanism.   
 
Professional association information.  Thirteen managers suggested that they rely 
on information sent out by professional associations (e.g., memos and bulletins), 
professional conferences, external training seminars, and professional associations’ legal 
staffs to ensure that they are adequately ensconced from litigation.  Seven managers 
mentioned this mechanism first, five mentioned it second, and one mentioned it third. 
  
 Local government attorneys.  Seven managers claimed that they seek advice from 
county or city attorneys and agencies’ legal staffs to keep their policies updated.  One 
manager mentioned this first, five mentioned it second, and one mentioned it third.  Only 
one manager claimed that he hired private attorneys to review his policies and keep him 
informed of changes in case law.  This was his most important (first mentioned) source of 
protection from liability. 
  
Accreditation and alternatives.  Six managers cited accreditation as a shield from 
litigation, explaining that the accreditation body requires an annual review of all policies.  
Four managers mentioned this mechanism first and two mentioned it second.  Though he 
cited the role of the accreditation body as the primary mechanism used to protect the agency 
from liability, one of these managers expressed disdain for accreditation and advised that he 
will not renew the department’s accreditation.  Two other managers cited an alternative 
mechanism to accreditation, contracting with a risk management corporation, as their first 
and second most important liability shields. The use of a risk management company, these 
managers argued, provides all the liability protection that accreditation brings but it is 
substantially more affordable and it does not constrain managers’ decision-making or 
mandate uniformity. Three other managers have developed another alternative to 
accreditation by hiring at least one officer in each department whose sole responsibilities 
are: (1) monitoring case law changes, (2) suggesting revisions to the standard operating 
procedures manual, and (3) conducting internal training based on these revisions.  
Additionally, two managers suggested that they regularly network with other local law 
enforcement managers in their counties, regions, and states to discuss policy changes. 
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Table 4: Mechanisms Used to Ensure Policies are Adequate and Timely 
Note:  One chief did not mention any mechanism 
 
 
 
 
The Use of These Mechanisms 
Foremost, one might handily draw the conclusion that the development and implementation 
of a pursuit policy are goals that the local law enforcement managers in this sample consider 
important enough to devote considerable time to fulfilling.  One might also begin to see that 
writing a pursuit policy is not a one-time endeavor.  In fact, these policies are constantly 
being revised and amended so that they are within the boundaries of current case law.  These 
responses also demonstrate that, in addition to the manager’s perceived obligation to remain 
informed about case law changes, court decisions, and other relevant data, he often feels an 
obligation to complement his own research with the advice of knowledgeable outsiders as 
well as his professional peers. 
 Table 4 shows that law enforcement managers often engage the aid of county and 
city attorneys, legal staffs, risk management corporations, and private attorneys in 
formulating policy.  It is unsurprising that these managers would attempt to enhance their 
legal accountability by consulting with these actors and groups.  It seems, too, that 
consulting with these sources of advice is a less expensive and less constraining choice than 
seeking and obtaining accreditation. Another potential benefit of seeking policy advice from 
these legal actors, especially in the cases of risk management corporations and private 
attorneys, is that doing so helps to diffuse legal responsibility in the aftermath of a pursuit-
related accident. 
 In addition to consulting legal experts for help with writing policies, managers’ 
T
y
p
e 
o
f 
m
a
n
a
g
er
  
A
cc
re
d
it
a
ti
o
n
 
H
ir
e 
p
ri
v
a
te
 l
a
w
y
er
(s
) 
C
o
n
tr
a
ct
 w
it
h
 r
is
k
 
m
a
n
a
g
em
en
t 
co
m
p
a
n
y
 
S
ee
k
 a
d
v
ic
e 
fr
o
m
 
co
u
n
ty
/c
it
y
 a
tt
o
rn
ey
s 
a
n
d
 l
eg
a
l 
st
a
ff
 
H
ir
e 
o
ff
ic
er
 d
ed
ic
a
te
d
 
to
 m
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g
 c
a
se
 l
a
w
 
ch
a
n
g
es
 
R
el
y
 o
n
 p
ro
fe
ss
io
n
a
l 
a
ss
o
ci
a
ti
o
n
s’
 b
u
ll
et
in
s,
 
m
em
o
s,
 c
o
n
fe
re
n
ce
s,
 
tr
a
in
in
g
, 
a
n
d
 l
eg
a
l 
st
a
ff
s 
L
o
o
k
 a
t 
ca
se
 l
a
w
 c
h
a
n
g
es
 
o
n
 t
h
ei
r 
o
w
n
 (
su
b
sc
ri
b
e 
to
 
W
es
t 
L
a
w
, 
et
c.
) 
o
n
 a
 
re
g
u
la
r 
b
a
si
s 
N
et
w
o
rk
 w
it
h
 o
th
er
 
ch
ie
fs
 a
n
d
 s
h
er
if
fs
 
C
h
ie
fs
 
Rank 
1
st
: 3 
Rank 
2
nd
: 2 
Rank 
1
st
: 1 
Rank 
1
st
: 0 
Rank 
2
nd
: 1 
Rank 1
st
: 
1 
Rank 
2
nd
: 4 
Rank 3
rd
:
 
1 
Rank 
1
st
: 1 
Rank 
2
nd
: 0 
Rank 
3
rd
:
 
1 
Rank 1
st
: 
3 
Rank 2
nd
: 
2 
Rank 3
rd
: 
1 
Rank 1
st
:
 
7 
Rank 
2
nd
: 3 
Rank 3
rd
:
 
1 
Rank 
1
st
: 1 
S
h
er
if
fs
 Rank 
1
st
: 1 
0 Rank 
1
st
: 1 
Rank 1
st
: 
0 
Rank 
2
nd
: 1 
Rank 
1
st
: 1 
Rank 1
st
: 
4 
Rank 2
nd
: 
3 
Rank 1
st
: 
5 
Rank 
2
nd
: 3 
Rank 
1
st
: 0 
Rank 
2
nd
: 1 
7
LaFrance: Pursuing an Answer: Bureaucratic and Legal Account
Published by Barbara Jordan Mickey Leland School of Public Affairs - Digital Scholarship,
 
- 46 - 
responses indicate that they also frequently receive legal advice from those outside the legal 
profession in at least three formal ways: (1) through memoranda and bulletins from 
professional associations to which they belong, (2) through their own and their subordinates’ 
formal training, and (3) through accreditation bodies; and at least one informal method: 
through networking and conversing with other managers.  Thus, the law enforcement 
managers in this sample seem to engage in what Frederickson (1999, 708) calls 
“administrative conjunction,” defined as “the array and character of horizontal formal and 
informal association between actors representing units in a networked public and the 
administrative behavior of these actors.” 
 
Administrative Conjunction 
Essentially, administrative conjunction occurs because problems often cross jurisdictional 
boundaries.  Police pursuits provide an excellent example of the need for cooperation 
between law enforcement managers from different agencies because pursuits can begin in 
one jurisdiction and carry on through others before they are finally terminated.  One sheriff 
explained that this possibility motivated him to work with the chiefs of municipal police 
departments within his county to craft very similar pursuit policies, agreeing on certain 
aspects of  pursuit behavior by their officers, so that everyone involved in the pursuit would 
be “on the same page” with regard to pursuit behavior.  In fact, at least one agency in a 
neighboring state joined in on the formulation of these tenets.  The sheriff explained:  
The pursuit policy [at my agency] came from my involvement with the [X-region] 
police administrators, made up of [5 other managers and myself].  We meet every 
month and work together to get grants for such things as public safety software.  
One of the ideas we had was a pursuit policy that is very similar throughout all of 
these agencies… because by the nature of a pursuit, it will be going through 
different jurisdictions.  If [City 1] had a policy that was very different from [City 
2], and [City 2] had a policy that was very different from the county’s policy….our 
officers crossing jurisdictions would become very confused about what they could 
and could not do.  So, we tried to model…not necessarily a county-wide policy, but 
a very similar one…that way, all of our people who are out working together are 
kind of on the same page and they know what everybody is supposed to be doing 
and what everybody is not supposed to be doing.  They have their policy and I have 
my policy, but they’re very similar. 
It is important to note that neither (1) participation in this group nor (2) agreeing to 
the policy tenets the group decided on is compulsory.  None of the managers involved in the 
group wield any coercive power over the others.  Instead, the group relies on the power of 
persuasion and peer pressure described in the literature of international diplomacy as “soft 
power” (Nye1990; 2004; Slaughter 2005).  Similar demonstrations of soft power occur 
through the other conduits mentioned above: accreditation and professional associations, and 
the formulation of very similar policy wording are not limited to pursuit driving. 
 Indeed, one could list several other instances when cooperation between agencies and 
different levels of government are absolutely imperative to meaningful criminal interdiction 
by law enforcement agencies.  Examples include, but are certainly not limited to: drug 
trafficking, stolen goods trafficking, and gang activity.  With the growth of information 
technology, especially the Internet, even greater possibilities arise for multi-jurisdictional 
criminal behavior.  As a result, conjunctive behavior between law enforcement agencies is 
necessary if police chiefs and sheriffs hope to be successful in disrupting such activity.   
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The Holistic Nature of Accountability 
Taken as a whole, managers’ consultation of groups and actors outside of the legal 
profession, but within the law enforcement profession, demonstrate the interrelated nature of 
public sector accountability streams.  In this instance, accountability to the law enforcement 
profession (professional accountability) leads to the development of reliable standard 
operating procedures.  Allegiance to these standard operating procedures (bureaucratic 
accountability) then serves to ensure that the agency is shielded from court losses, or is 
accountable to the court system and exogenous legal actors and groups who otherwise might 
attempt to impose legal sanctions upon the agency (legal accountability).  Perhaps, too, a 
benefit of having a well-developed pursuit policy is the avoidance of public outrage that 
might result from the consequences of unrestricted pursuit behavior (political 
accountability).   
Despite their best efforts, many of the managers in my sample have cited examples 
where policies alone could not save lives.  In the next section, I consider the painful truth 
that no matter how well thought-out and well-written an agency’s pursuit policy may be, 
even the most justified pursuits have resulted in tragedy. 
 
Can Pursuit Policies be Perfected? 
While these managers’ responses might cause a reader to reflect upon the painstaking 
measures that law enforcement executives take to shield themselves from liability, the 
dynamics of the policy—creation-review-revision—cycle also highlights the fact that none 
of the managers in this study have been able to create a perfect pursuit policy.  One 
manager, after moments of silence and, I imagine, deep reflection, explained, “You do the 
same thing 100 times and you get the results that are good and the last time [things go 
wrong].”  This chief went on to describe a recent occurrence in his city, involving the 
county’s sheriff’s department, where the officer in question was not engaged in a pursuit.  
Instead, this officer was simply responding to a call.  With slow, deliberate, and emotion-
tinged language, the chief explained: 
You know, we just don’t have the pursuits here that you would expect. Actually we 
had one of the deputies here on a straight emergency run, you know, just a lights 
and sirens type run, crossed the street and it’s still going through the process, he 
hit… T-boned and killed a girl back in October. He is [a] thirty-year veteran and 
was going to retire now.  You know we did everything we did the reconstruction, 
we called the state in and interviewed the witnesses, and presented the case to this 
DA. He exempted himself and the case is going to a DA two counties over. We 
have charged him with reckless homicide. It’s the same basic…if its legally 
justified but the risk outweighs the benefit analysis that you need to go 
through…whatever you’re doing if you go through a red light regardless of lights 
and sirens by state statute you’re still responsible for your action. You know you 
need the standard by which the decision was made. You had the right to go through 
the intersection but it is going to be judged.  Was it a reasonable and prudent thing 
to do? Could you have stopped? If you go through that intersection and you have 
contact…the guy was going fifty-two miles an hour at the point of impact, and 
something I have been told anecdotally was that the history of the department was 
they always drive fast. I mean if you’re forty miles away from your back up and 
they’re at a domestic, you know, they drove fast. That was what you got because 
9
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you felt you were protecting and saving lives. You know a guy said when he came 
for an observation the other night, that going fifty-two miles an hour was cutting 
the speeds they used to drive at in half. You know so he had had the effect of the 
change. The tragic part is you are not above the law, you trained it, you knew it, 
should have known it. You know and you know, all you can do is you go through 
your criminal investigation and make sure it is a neutral party, in that case the 
county had us investigate it, and we called in the state for reconstruction expertise. 
Another chief shared how the need to update his department’s pursuit policy 
became apparent after a tragic pursuit outcome 15 years earlier.  Here, he tells of this tragic 
occurrence and the impact that it had on the department’s standard operating procedures for 
pursuits: 
Nothing is more near and dear to the [city’s name] police department than the issue 
of pursuit.  We lost an officer 15 years ago in a pursuit.  He was pursuing a non-
felony [offender who was] doing doughnuts in the street.  The supervisor should’ve 
discontinued the pursuit, but this officer was approaching the car and a non-contact 
car all of a sudden appeared.  The officer lost control and hit a telephone pole and 
was killed instantly.  He had a 5 month old baby at home and a 3 year old, as well 
as a wife.  He was 29 years old.  The [city’s name] police department is very 
concerned about our pursuit policy.  We had been a department since 1889, and 
prior to this incident, the last time we had an officer killed was in 1926 when an 
officer was shot by a bootlegger.  Between 1926 and 1993, we were involved in 
hundreds of pursuits where nobody got hurt until this happened.  This caused my 
predecessor, the former chief, to review pursuit policy from top down. 
Yet another manager, a county sheriff, explained that a pursuit does not have to be 
conducted a high rates of speed to be dangerous.  Here, he described an incident in which 
two of his officers were pursuing a vehicle at moderate speeds.  The fleeing suspect cut out 
his headlights and ended up crashing into a van with 4 university coeds.  The impact of the 
collision killed the van’s driver, “made a paraplegic out of another passenger,” and injured 
the other two.  The fleeing driver, however, was unscathed. 
 
Policy Restrictiveness 
The literature concerning police pursuits identifies three types of pursuit policies, based on 
the degree to which these policies allow officers in a given agency to pursue fleeing 
offenders, based largely on offense type, e.g., misdemeanor, soft felony, forcible felony, etc. 
(Fennessy et al. 1970; Alpert and Dunham 1989). These categories are important because 
previous research indicates that the “most influential factor” that officers consider in 
deciding whether to continue a pursuit is “the offense for which the suspect is wanted” 
(Alpert 1998, 347), and one can reasonably expect policy restrictiveness to be a 
manifestation of a given agency’s attention to legal liability concerns. 
 
Judgmental Policies  
The first category of pursuit policies, judgmental, is the least restrictive.  This type of policy 
allows officers almost absolute discretion in deciding whether they will pursue a given 
offender.  Two respondents in this study, both county sheriffs, described their policies in a 
way that can be categorized as judgmental. 
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Restrictive Policies   
The second category of pursuit policies, restrictive, limits an officer’s discretion in choosing 
whether to pursue by limiting the types of offense that are deemed worthy of pursuit.  
Generally speaking, restrictive policies only allow pursuits of offenders accused of 
committing forcible felonies rather than non-violent felony offenses.  Fourteen respondents 
described their pursuit policies as fitting into this category (see Table 5). 
 
Discouragement Policies  
The final category of pursuit policies, discouragement, strictly limits pursuits to situations in 
which greater harm is likely to be caused to citizens if there is no pursuit (e.g., pursuing a 
mass murderer or someone who has kidnapped a child). Thirteen managers described their 
pursuit policies in ways that could be categorized as discouragement (see Table 5). 
One manager, who was actively revising his agency’s pursuit policy at the time of 
the interview, was unable to provide a description of his policy that fit any of the three 
categories.  Subsequently, his responses to other items will be omitted from the analyses that 
follow.   
Table 5: Policy Restrictiveness 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
Note: One chief did not describe his pursuit policy. He is currently writing a new one. 
 
Correlates of Policy Restrictiveness 
Past research has explored correlates of the amount of restriction written into law 
enforcement agencies’ pursuit policies.  For instance, in a study of the pursuit policies of 23 
city police agencies and 47 state police and state patrol agencies, Kennedy, Homant, and 
Kennedy (1992) find that, while the content of pursuit policies varies substantially, 
municipal police agencies in their study were much more likely to restrict officer discretion 
in pursuits than were state police agencies.  Kennedy et al. (1992, 242) also found that: (1) 
the amount of detail with which a policy is written shares a minor relationship (R=.24; 
p=.05) with the overall restrictiveness of the policy; (2) there is a positive, but statistically 
insignificant (R=.26; p=.30) relationship between population density and the restrictiveness 
of an agency’s pursuit policy; (3) and no relationship between the policies of a given state 
and cities within this state. 
 
Testing These Correlates 
 While I have not analyzed the level of detail in the pursuit policies of the 30 agencies 
in my sample, I can offer a modest comparison of the latter two findings with the data I have 
collected, albeit with some slight variations.  First, rather than using Kennedy, et. al.’s  
(1992) 5-point scale of pursuit restriction, I will use Fennessey, et. al.’s (1970) 3-point scale, 
which classifies pursuit policies according to the three categories described above.  Second, 
rather than using population density, I will use the USDA’s county-level urban influence 
data.  Finally, rather than using state police agencies as my comparison group, I will 
Type of 
manager 
Judgmental Restrictive Discouragement 
Chiefs 0 9 8 
Sheriffs 2 5 5 
11
LaFrance: Pursuing an Answer: Bureaucratic and Legal Account
Published by Barbara Jordan Mickey Leland School of Public Affairs - Digital Scholarship,
 
- 50 - 
compare the policies of county sheriffs’ departments with those of municipal police 
departments. 
 
Propositions 
I expect that my findings will match Kennedy, et. al.’s (1992) findings with regard to policy 
restrictiveness and urbanization, though my results might reach statistical significance.  
Because municipal and county law enforcement managers have more opportunities to meet 
and discuss common goals, I expect that the relationship between municipal police agencies’ 
policies and the policies of county sheriffs’ departments in paired counties will be stronger 
than the relationship these researchers found between state-level and municipal pursuit 
policies. 
 
Findings 
In line with Kennedy et al.’s (1992) findings, the relationship between county urban 
influence code and the restrictiveness of an agency’s pursuit policy is insignificant, but is in 
the expected direction (in this case, negative, since smaller counties are given larger UI 
codes).  Also in line with the Kennedy team, I find no relationship between policy 
restrictiveness and sharing the same county among those agencies in the same counties.  In 
fact, only one of the eight groups of agencies who share a county had the same level of 
restrictiveness in every agency.  Even when the county sheriff’s office is excluded from the 
analysis and only counties with multiple police agencies are included, there is no 
relationship between host county and pursuit policy restrictiveness. 
 Despite anecdotal evidence from at least one county, the data do not support the 
assertion that administrative conjunction aimed at formulating very similar pursuit policies 
is occurring on a large-scale between local law enforcement managers based in the same 
county.  This is disheartening, given the potential benefits of conjunctive behavior in law 
enforcement iterated above.  Perhaps, though, conjunction does take place but is carried out 
in more formal settings.  To test this possibility, I will next consider measures of association 
between the restrictiveness of an agency’s policy (coded 1 for judgmental, 2 for restrictive, 
and 3 for discouragement) with indicators of engagement in these formal organizations (total 
professional association memberships, total training, and education, and accreditation). 
 Table (6) shows some promise for the argument that administrative conjunction 
occurring through at least one formal conduit serves to unify the tenets of pursuit policy 
among multiple agencies.  While a manager’s total training shares no relationship with the 
restrictiveness of his agency’s pursuit policy, the manager’s education level does share a 
positive relationship with policy restrictiveness, though this relationship is significant only 
at the .10 p-level.   
When considering the total number of professional associations to which a manager 
belongs, however, the relationship of this variable to policy restrictiveness is marginally 
significant (p<.09) in the opposite direction than expected.  The only potential explanation I 
can provide for this finding is that the manager might be receiving conflicting policy advice 
from multiple professional associations at once, thus precluding the manager from making 
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Table 6 Measures of Association for Policy Restrictiveness 
 
 
 
Note. Measure of association was Spearman’s Rho. 
*p < .05. † < .10. 
 
his policy more restrictive. This makes sense theoretically because the need for multiple 
professional associations would dissipate if each association advocated for the same values 
and policies. 
Accreditation status does not share a relationship with policy restrictiveness at all.  
This non-finding might be explained by the fact that only six agencies in the sample were 
accredited. 
The strongest relationship I have found is the negative association between a 
manager’s total years in law enforcement and the restrictiveness of his pursuit policy.  This 
seems counterintuitive because one might expect a long-serving manager to be more 
cognizant of rulings about pursuit liability, or to be more familiar with negative outcomes 
associated with pursuits.  However, one might also theorize that longer-serving managers 
might still operate with the same sense of liability that was common when they began their 
careers.  This is possible because they might also be more detached from academy training, 
field training, and formal education than their younger counterpart managers.   
Most interestingly, in terms of the larger project, is that no significant differences in 
policy restrictiveness could be found between county sheriffs and municipal police chiefs.  
This finding is what one might expect to find, since legal liability has an equal impact on 
each type of manger.  Thus, sheriffs and chiefs might be just as likely to attempt to 
safeguard themselves from courtroom proceedings related to flaws in their policies. 
 
 
Independent Variables Policy 
restrictiveness 
Significance 
level 
Sheriff (1, 0) -.148 .434 
Age -.246 .189 
Years in current position -.210 .266 
Years in this agency -.163 .389 
Total years in law enforcement -.383* .040 
Total professional association memberships -.316† .090 
Accreditation .037 .844 
Total training .096 .615 
Sworn employee ratio .141 .458 
Total employees -.169 .373 
Education .307* .099 
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Conclusion and Future Research Suggestions 
Every manager in this sample expressed a strong interest in the development of sound 
pursuit policies. All but two of these managers explained that the primary motivation for 
doing so was protecting themselves and their agencies from legal liability arising out of an 
inadequate policy.  In the aftermath of a tragedy resulting from a pursuit, most of these 
managers were driven to conduct an internal investigation in order to gauge how strictly 
their officer adhered to the policy manual; an indication of the agency’s level of bureaucratic 
accountability.  
 However, these managers also explained that they continuously consult with actors 
and groups in the legal and law enforcement professions in order to revise these policies so 
that they do not become stagnant with regard to changes in case law, and subsequently 
enhance the agency’s vulnerability to lawsuits.  Thus, this microcosm of policy development 
in law enforcement agencies shows that at least three accountability streams, professional, 
legal, and bureaucratic, work in concert to produce positive outcomes for the agency, the 
profession, and those who might be endangered in a police pursuit. 
Unfortunately, this long-term symbiosis does not always come without a short-term 
price tag in the event that an agency is caught unaware with a lackluster pursuit policy.  
Presently, there is no universal pursuit policy used by all local law enforcement agencies.  
More vexing is the fact that this is probably for the best, as each manager must consider his 
own internal and external environments, resource constraints, and societal expectations 
when crafting a policy.  Indeed, one might just as readily criticize a police chief or county 
sheriff for his reticence to engage in a hot pursuit to catch a bad guy as one might criticize 
the manager for any negative externality resulting from a less restrictive pursuit policy.   
An example of these multi-directional pulling forces on the manager comes from 
preliminary measures of association that show marginally significant relationships between 
education and policy restriction, in a positive direction, and total professional association 
memberships and policy restriction, in a negative direction.  It could be the case that 
professional associations and formal educational institutions are giving disparate advice to 
the local law enforcement manager about crafting a pursuit policy. 
These data indicate, too, that longer-serving managers are least likely to have 
restrictive pursuit policies.  A critic might assert that this finding demonstrates a need for 
more recently trained and educated managers who might be more likely to focus on the 
newer realities of pursuit liability. Others might argue, instead, that these longer-serving 
managers are more concerned with carrying out their professional duties than placating 
lawyers and judges or selling out to civil juries. To get at the heart of this finding, future 
research should explore this trend.   
Perhaps the most important finding to carry away from this study rests in the notion 
of administrative conjunction between local law enforcement managers facing common 
problems.  While my findings suggest that such conjunction does not always lead to policy 
agreement, there is tremendous potential in formal and informal conjunctive endeavors to 
tackle a host of policy concerns that have ripened with the boom in information technology 
and a decline of jurisdictional relevance. This phenomenon deserves its own study, outside 
of the context of one type of policy, in order to see if it is effective in manifesting common 
goals (if not common policies) between multiple agencies. 
Given the ubiquity of pursuits involving minorities, future research should also ask 
whether some pursuits are a direct result of racial profiling. This research question fits into a 
larger body of literature on the disproportionate interactions, and subsequent incarceration, 
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of African Americans, especially males, known in the scholarly community as the “new Jim 
Crow” (Alexander, 2012). Some preliminary research has begun on the relationship between 
pursuits and racial profiling; especially those depicted in “reality” television shows such as 
COPS and World’s Wildest Police Videos, leading Prosise and Johnson (2004) to argue that 
these television shows implicitly endorse racial profiling.  As with many studies of police 
pursuit policy, a final caveat is in order. Kennedy and his colleagues (1992) remind the 
reader that the written policy, no matter how much effort goes into crafting it, is only as 
realistic as the unwritten policy, as found in the actual behavior of officers. 
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